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The Behavior of International Bank Lending to Latin America,  1985-2000
Over the last decade,  foreign bank lending to developing countries has risen significantly.
According to the Bank for International  Settlements (BIS), by the end of 2000, international bank
claims  -the  sum  of direct  (cross-border)  foreign  bank  lending  plus  locally  funded  claims  in
foreign currency-  to the non-bank private  sector in developing countries  reached  a record 421.2
billion dollars, up from 112.2 billion dollars in  1985.1  To put this figure in perspective,  this sum
represents  13  percent  of  total  private  sector  credit  in  the  developing  world.2 The  relative
importance  of  international  bank  claims  is  larger  for  countries  in  Latin  America  and  in
developing Europe,  where by the end of 2000, they averaged 40 percent of private sector credit.3
The importance of foreign bank lending in developing economies  has stimulated a lively
debate on the stability of such claims. One view is that foreign banks can be a reliable source of
credit as, relative to domestic banks, they are less dependent on flighty local deposits and can tap
a  more  stable,  diversified  international  pool  of liquidity.  The  alternative  view  is  that  foreign
banks  are  unstable,  transmitting  shocks  from their home  countries  or  from  other  countries  to
which they lend, and pulling out at the first sign of trouble in host (borrower)  countries.
A number of recent  studies have  shed light on the behavior of foreign banks.  Peek and
Rosengren  (2000a)  find  that  Japanese  bank  lending  to  the  U.S.  was  strongly  affected  by
' International bank claims refer to the BIS definition of consolidated  international claims of BIS reporting  banks
(internationally  active banks in BIS reporting countries) which includes all claims funded in a BIS reporting country
but lent in a developing country and claims funded and lent in a developing country in foreign currency through a
BIS reporting bank.  BIS reporting countries in 2000 are Australia, Austria,  Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany,  Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,  Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom, and US.
2 Private sector credit refers to credit provided by banks operating in the developing world (both foreign and
domestic).  Source:  IMF, International Financial  Statistics.
3 While  impressive,  these  figures are  likely to underestimate  overall  foreign  bank  lending to developing  countries
since the BIS figures  on international  claims to the private sector encompass  cross-border  lending plus  local lending
in  foreign currency, but exclude local lending in local currency.economic  events in Japan that, in turn, affected the U.S. commercial  real estate sector.  Focusing
on the  behavior of U.S.  bank claims  (cross-border  and  locally funded)  on a number of regions
including  Latin  America  since  the  mid-1980s,  Goldberg  (2001)  finds  that  U.S.  economic
conditions impacted U.S.  bank foreign lending.  However,  she  also finds that U.S. bank  foreign
lending was unaffected by economic conditions in host (borrower) countries  and that U.S. banks
did not retrench their lending  significantly following  international  financial  crises.  Dages et al.
(2000) focus on the local lending behavior of all foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico over the
late  1990s.  They argue that foreign bank  penetration did not increase  financial  sector  instability
by showing that foreign banks  in Argentina and Mexico  exhibited  stronger and less volatile loan
growth  than domestic  banks  between  1994  and  1999,  i.e.  during and  after  the  Tequila  crisis.
Peek and Rosengren  (2000b)  reach a similar conclusion by examining the behavior of direct (or
cross-border)  foreign  lending  and  local  claims  from  foreign banks  on  Argentina,  Mexico,  and
Brazil over the period  1994-1999.  Finally, Van  Rijckeghem  and Weder (2000) examine  a panel
of BIS  data  on flows  to  30  emerging markets  disaggregated  by  11  banking  centers,  to  test the
role  of bank  lending  in  transmitting  currency  crises.  They  find that bank  exposures to  a crisis
country help predict bank flows in third countries  after the Asian crisis, and to a lesser extent the
Mexican  1994 crisis.
The  papers  discussed  above  make  specific  contributions  to  the  debate  regarding  the
behavior of foreign banks.  However,  each  study concentrates  on a narrow  set of issues  and/or
covers  a  limited  number  of home  (lender)  and  host  (borrower)  countries.  In  this  study,  we
employ a comprehensive  data set on international  bank claims across a wide range of home  and
host  countries  over  a  fifteen  year  period  to  revisit  some  of the  issues  examined  by  previous
studies,  and  to  explore  questions  that  have  not  been  investigated  previously.  Our  dataset,
2provided by the BIS, covers  international bank claims from the  seven most important lenders  to
Latin America (i.e.,  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Japan, Spain, the UK,  and the U.S.) on the non-
bank private sector in the ten largest borrowers in the region (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela),  over the period 1985-2000.4
We focus our study on Latin America for a number of reasons. First, foreign banks have
had an active presence in this region since the beginning of our sample and, as noted above, it is
now one of the regions  with the highest foreign bank participation.  Second, while for the region
as a  whole foreign bank lending  has increased  in recent  years, there are  still differences  in the
extent  to  which  countries  depend  on  this  source  of  funds.  For  example,  international  bank
lending  (cross-border  or direct  foreign lending  and  local  lending  in foreign  currency)  in 2000
represented  more  than  55  percent  of domestic  credit  for  Argentina  and  Peru,  but  it  only
accounted  for  19  percent  of domestic  credit  for  Brazil.  Third,  the  region  has  experienced
considerable  shocks (positive and negative)  during the period of study.  Therefore, we think that
Latin  America's  experience  over the  last  15  years  offers  a  unique  opportunity  to  analyze  the
determinants of foreign bank lending.
Using  this  dataset  on  international  bank  lending,  we  attempt  to  address  a wider  set  of
issues than previous  studies regarding  foreign bank behavior  and the  'stability'  of their claims.
In particular,  we seek to answer questions like:  (1)  do foreign banks transmit shocks  from their
home countries?  (2) Do portfolio adjustments spill over to individual host countries?  (3) How do
foreign  banks  respond  to  positive  and  negative  shocks?  (4)  Do  foreign  banks  retrench  their
lending  during  crises  in  host  countries?  (5)  How  does  the  level  of exposure  affect  banks'
responsiveness  to shocks in host countries and, in particular,  do banks become more or less pro-
cyclical  as  exposure  levels  rise?  (6)  Do increases  in local  presence  by foreign banks  (through
4 The data on the sectoral breakdown of lending by banks in specific BIS countries to individual borrower countries
3brick  and  mortar  operations)  affect  their  reaction  to  home  and  host  shocks?  (7)  Is  the
responsiveness of foreign banks to different types of shocks similar across lenders?
In  examining  the  determinants  of foreign  bank  lending  we  include  not  only  standard
home and host country  variables (like growth rates, risk ratings,  and interest  rates), but also  we
test for the significance  of other factors.  For example,  models of portfolio allocation  show that
under standard rules of portfolio choice an unexpected decline in the value of one or more assets
may provoke  a portfolio adjustment  across the board. 5 Applying this result to our context,  some
shocks might then result in an  'indiscriminate'  change  in the claims  on a particular  host country
and a positive  relation between changes in the whole international  lending portfolio and changes
in claims  on any one country.  To examine  the impact of overall  international portfolio  changes
on the claims to an individual host country, we include as an explanatory  variable the change in
claims to all countries other than that individual host.
We  also  investigate  whether  the  extent  and type  of exposure  to  a particular  country is
important in explaining the change in claims.  One view might be that the greater the exposure of
an international  bank  to  a particular  country,  the more pro-cyclical  its  lending behavior  might
become.  This might be the case for example for a bank that is not highly diversified.  However,
an alternative  view is that as a bank's exposure to a country  grows, the bank has more incentives
to learn about the home country conditions and hence not to respond so strongly to noisy signals
of good  or bad  future  events6. We  investigate  the  role of exposure  on the  responsiveness  to
shocks in two ways.  First, we interact host growth, changes in host risk ratings, and the indicator
for  crises  in host  countries  with  a  measure  of bank  exposure  to test whether  lenders  that  are
is confidential and was provided to us by the BIS with explicit authorization  from each of the relevant central banks.
5 See Schinasi and Smith (1999).
6  For example, Calvo and Mendoza (2000)  argue that as investors become more diversified, and hence their average
exposures  in any particular asset decrease,  they have reduced incentives to learn about the fundamentals of each
4highly exposed to a country react less to domestic shocks in that country.  Second, because  in the
second half of the 1  990s there was an increase in brick and mortar operations of foreign banks in
Latin America,  we examine  whether there are differences  in the behavior of foreign banks over
time, as the nature of their exposure to this region changed.
Finally, we incorporate  specifications that allow us to test for two types of asymmetries
in  the  responsiveness  of foreign  bank  lending  to  shocks.  First,  we  test  whether  all  lenders
respond  similarly  to  shocks  by testing whether  it  is valid to pool  across lenders.  Secondly,  we
allow  the  reaction  of foreign  banks  to  shocks  to  depend  on whether  these  are  positive  or
negative.
Our empirical  estimations allow us to corroborate,  for a larger combination of home and
host countries, over a relative  long period of time, some of the results  found by other studies. In
particular, like Peek and Rosengren (2000a)  and Goldberg (2001), we find that home country
conditions (i.e., conditions in the country where foreign banks'  headquarters reside) are
important in explaining changes in private sector claims. Also, consistent with other studies we
find that foreign bank lending does not retrench during crises in the host countries  (see Dages et
al. (2000), Peek and Rosengren  (2000b), Goldberg (2001)).
More importantly, our work yields interesting new results. First, while foreign banks
across lender countries appear to react similarly to host country shocks, the magnitude of their
reaction to shocks in their own countries is different.  Second, lending to individual host countries
is positively associated with changes in claims to all other countries. Third, the higher the overall
exposure of home country banks to a given host country, the less responsive  are those banks'
claims to host country shocks. Fourth, as brick and mortar operations become more important
asset and hence react more strongly to 'signals'  on expected return or risk.  This suggests that as foreign banks
become  more exposed to a particular host country, they react less to changes in host country variables.
5over time, foreign banks' reaction to external and portfolio  shocks is diminished. Finally, we
uncover asymmetries regarding foreign banks'  response to positive and negative shocks, given
that banks appear to respond more to the former than to the latter.
The  rest of this paper  is organized  as  follows.  Section  II  discusses  the data used in  this
paper.  Section III presents the empirical  methodology.  Section IV describes the empirical results.
Finally,  Section V concludes.
II. Data and Descriptive  Statistics
Foreign  banks provide financing to developing  countries in at least two ways.  First, they
provide  direct  (or  cross-border)  financing  from  their  headquarters  and  affiliates  outside  the
developing  world.  Second,  they establish  operations  (branches  and  subsidiaries)  in developing
countries  and provide  financing  with local  funding.  In this paper  we  analyze  the behavior  of
'international bank (or financial)  claims'  on the non-bank private  sector as defined by the BIS.7
In other  words,  our  main variable  of study  includes  direct foreign  lending  (from  outside  host
countries  to  local  institutions)  in  any  currency  plus  local  claims  in  foreign  currency  from
subsidiaries or branches of BIS reporting banks from seven home countries (i.e.,  Canada, France,
Japan,  Germany,  Spain,  UK,  and  US)  to  the ten  largest economies  in Latin America  (namely,
Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Peru,  Uruguay,  and
Venezuela)  over the period  1985-2000.  Claims  extended  from a local  subsidiary  or branch  but
funded by another part of the same  BIS reporting  bank,  located outside of the host country,  are
consolidated.  The principal  balance  sheet  items  included  in the  claims  that we  study are loans
'For  a full description of this data see the BIS "Guide to International  Banking Statistics",  July 2000.
6and advances to the private  sector as well as holdings of securities  and participations.8 The data
frequency  is annual.
This  definition of foreign lending  represents  a compromise.  On the  one  hand, we might
have  chosen to work  with a narrower definition  including  only the direct foreign  lending from
outside  our host countries.  However,  this  would have  left out completely the  growing trend of
foreign banks investing in brick and mortar operations in our host countries  and extending  loans
locally.  On the other hand,  we could have attempted  to include all local  claims including  those
funded in local currency.
Unfortunately,  the BIS does not report data on local claims  in local currency  to the non-
bank  private  sector  (it only  reports  total  local  claims  in local  currency  including  those  to the
public  sector). Furthermore, there are a number of reasons why including these claims might not
be  appropriate.  First,  it is not  clear how much such  claims  add to the  'exposure'  of a foreign
bank.  Local  currency  deposits  that  fund  local  lending  of foreign  banks'  brick  and  mortar
operations  can be thought of as  a hedge  against  currency  and possibly  even  against  sovereign
risks.  Second, we wish to focus on those aspects of foreign bank operations that are distinct. The
local  currency  operations  of foreign banks  are  the  operations  most  likely  to resemble those  of
local  banks.  As we  are interested  in assessing  the behavior  of banks  that  are characterized  by
access to an international pool of liquidity, including claims  extended in local currency does not
appear  appropriate  for that goal.  For these  reasons, we adopt  'international financial  (or bank)
claims'  as  a  reasonable  measure  of foreign  bank  lending  and  note  that  this  definition  has
moreover become  something of a standard in the industry9
8 Claims are not adjusted to consider guarantees and collateral.  While at first hand this might seem to overestimate
the exposure that banks have to certain countries, it is  not clear that the quality of  the collateral and guarantees  can
be compared across countries.  Therefore, it is  not obvious that greater guarantees in a  country with poor legal
systems translate  into less exposure relative to other countries where  such guarantees  are not offered.
9 It might also be argued that local foreign currency deposits are more likely to be owned by non-residents and hence
should be included as part of the 'international pool of liquidity'  available to foreign banks whereas local currency
7Also,  due to  a number  of factors  we  limit our study  to claims  on the non-bank  private
sector  as  opposed  to  total  claims.'0 First,  we  want  to  abstract  from  political  or  strategic
considerations  that might  affect  lending to  governments.  Second,  it is likely that while  the vast
majority  of private  sector claims  are loans,  claims  on  the public  sector  are mostly  more  liquid
bonds.  End of year stocks  for the latter may then not necessarily  be representative  of exposure
and the BIS data does not control  well  for  credit risk mitigation techniques  such as derivatives.
While  this  might  also  be  a  problem  for  private  sector  claims,  we  feel  that  this  problem  is
minimized in this case.
Figure  1 shows the  evolution of real claims  to the non-bank  private sector from banks in
the  seven  BIS-reporting  lender  countries  to  the  ten  borrowing  countries  in  Latin  America.
Following  the debt crisis in Latin America,  claims to the  region declined in real terms between
1985  and  1990.  However,  over  the  1990s,  real  claims  rebounded  rising  rapidly and surpassing
the  100  billion  dollars  mark  by  the  end  of the  decade.  As  a percentage  of Latin  America's
domestic private  credit, the  importance of foreign  bank financing  from the seven BIS-reporting
countries declined over the second half of the  1980s (see Figure 2). However, between  1990 and
2000, the ratio of private sector claims from banks in the seven BIS-reporting  countries to private
sector credit in Latin America rose from 12 to 28 percent.
Figure  3 illustrates the  exposure of BIS  reporting banks from the seven  home reporting
countries  to Latin  America.  In the  early to mid-1980s,  claims  to Latin America  accounted  for
more than  one third of the  overall portfolio  of international  financial claims  of the  seven BIS-
reporting  countries. As a result of the debt crisis, foreign banks diversified  away from the region
local claims/deposits  are less  likely to be owned by non-residents.  Finally, it is also worth noting that, although the
local currency  local claims of BIS reporting banks have been growing in Latin America, they remain well below 50
percent of total foreign claims (i.e., total claims to the private and public sector) and so adopting the definition of
international  financial claims as described  in  the text captures  the majority of foreign bank lending operations.
8over the  second half of the  1980s. Over the last decade,  exposure to Latin America has remained
below the 1980s levels, but has risen steadily over time, reaching  17 percent in 2000.
Among the  individual  countries in Latin America,  as expected,  the  largest economies  in
the region attract most of the international  bank claims (see Figure 4).  On average  between  1985
and 2000, Brazil received 27 percent of all foreign bank claims directed to the non-bank private
sector in the  region.  Mexico received 25  percent of such claims  and Argentina 21  percent.  Both
Chile and Venezuela accounted for less than  10 percent of these claims.
Figure 5 illustrates  the importance of the individual home country bank lenders to the
region.  Among the seven top lending countries to the region, the U.S., France, Germany and
recently, Spain have been the most important sources of funds throughout the sample.  The U.S.
has been the most consistent lender to the region, accounting for more than 20 percent of all
claims to the non-bank private sector in this region throughout the entire period 1985-2000.
German lending to Latin America has hovered between 20 and  15 percent of all lending to this
region. While French banks accounted for more than 35 percent of all lending to Latin America
in 1990, this figure dropped to less than  15 percent in the year 2000. Spain has emerged as the
lender with the fastest growing share of claims to this region, accounting for less than 5 percent
of claims  in 1985 but exceeding 20 percent of total claims to the non-bank private sector in 2000.
Figure  6  shows  the  exposure  of foreign  banks  from  BIS  reporting  countries  to  Latin
America (i.e.,  the ratio of claims by each lender to the region over total international  claims for
each  lender)  over the period  1985-2000.  Throughout this period,  Spain  and the U.S.  were  the
lenders  with the  highest  exposure  to this  region.  Spanish  exposure  averaged  50  percent  of its
total  international  private  claims,  while  for the U.S. this figure  was  35  percent.  However,  the
10  The BIS also gathers  data on claims on banks, however,  we focus on non-bank claims because the former  include
claims on the official monetary authorities  and on public banks and we want to study private sector claims.
9trend in exposure across these two countries is very different.  While U.S. exposure has remained
fairly  constant  throughout the  period  1985-2000,  Spanish  exposure  has  increased  significantly
from less than 40 percent in the early 1990s to more than 68 percent by 2000.
Having  described  the  pattern and  importance of foreign  bank lending to Latin  America,
Table  1 and  2  provide  some  descriptive  statistics  to  illustrate  the  stability  of this  source  of
financing  vis-a-vis  real  domestic  credit."  Table  1 compares  the  growth  of international  bank
claims  and of domestic  credit during tranquil and crisis periods  in the host countries.  The  latter
refer to banking, currency or twin crises.12
According to Table  1, both international  and domestic credit decline during  host country
crises,  but while the average  growth of BIS lenders'  claims  on Latin America  remains positive,
real domestic changes are, on average, negative. 1 3 At the same time, neither foreign nor domestic
credit  seems  to  have  declined  significantly  (when  compared  to tranquil  periods)  during  recent
international  crises  outside  the  host  countries  we  focus  on.  Furthermore,  Table  2  explicitly
compares the behavior of international  bank claims against real domestic credit. This table shows
that domestic credit growth exhibits  significantly higher volatility  (as  measured by the standard
deviation  of changes  in  credit)  than  claims  from  BIS  reporting  banks  in  these  seven  home
countries,  both  during  host  crisis,  and  during  tranquil  periods.' 4 There  is  some  evidence  of
transmission  of portfolio  shocks:  the volatility  of BIS  claims  is  higher  than  the  volatility  of
domestic  credit  during  the  Asian  crisis,  although  as  can  be  seen  from  Table  1 only  the  U.S.
reduced  its claims  on Latin America during that period.  In fact,  when we consider the  Russian
"  See footnote 2.
12  Table  A.1  lists  these  episodes  for each  of the  ten Latin  American  countries  in  our  sample  and  provides  the
definition and sources used to identify them.
"  Rather than comparing the behavior of domestic credit vis-a-vis foreign  lending during all types of crises
combined, Table  A.2 reports similar statistics distinguishing between  currency, banking,  and twin crises.  In terms of
percentages,  domestic credit falls by more, on average, than foreign bank lending during banking and twin crises.
The reverse  is  true during currency crises.  However, as shown  in Table  A.3, these differences  in means are not
statistically  significant.
10crisis episode,  the volatility of BIS claims is  significantly lower than the  volatility of domestic
credit.  In general  these statistics  suggest that there  is no  systematic  evidence that international
financial claims  are less "stable" than credit originated locally.  However,  this is only partial and
descriptive evidence  and needs to be verified with a more careful empirical  approach,  which we
undertake next.
III. Empirical Methodology
In this section we discuss the econometric model that we employ to analyze the behavior
of foreign bank lending.  In particular, we draw on previous literature on international bank
behavior and on the extensive literature on capital flows that estimates reduced form models that
consider both home (lender)  or pull and host (borrower) or push variables.  '5 However,  we also
add variables motivated by recent theory.  In particular,  we add extra variables to investigate the
role of portfolio  shocks as well as the impact of exposure on banks' responsiveness to shocks.
Hence the general econometric  model can be represented as follows16
%AClaims',  =a'  +  ;  + I3Home Factorsij,  + XjHost Factors  l +
6j (HostFactorsi,t-1 *Exposure ', ,)+  y(%AOprivateclaims)',  +  (1)
where j=l  to  7 identifies  banks  from each of the  seven BIS home  (lender) countries,  i=1  to  10
indicates  each  individual  Latin American host  (borrower)  country and t=1985  to 2000 refers to
14 Table A.3  shows that the volatility of domestic credit is statistically higher than that of foreign bank lending for
currency and twin crises.
'5 See Goldberg  (2001), Peek and Rosengren (2000a) on banks and see Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993),
Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1998), Fernandez-Aries (1996), and Hemandez,  Mellado, and Valdes (2001)  on
capital flows.
16  Alternatively,  we could estimate a separate regression for each home (lender) country, using Zellner's Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions method, to account for contemporaneous  cross-equation  correlation in the error terms. As a
robustness check, we estimated  separate equations for each lender and compared those results to the results from
estimating Equation  1.  The differences  are not significant,  and, fiurthermore, the drawback to the SUR method is
that it forces our data into a balanced panel, significantly reducing the number of  observations.
11the time period  considered.'7 %AClaims  '  is the percentage  change  in real  claims  from banks in
home country j to the private  non-bank sector in host country  i between  t- 1 and t.  As explained
above,  we  use  consolidated  international  financial  claims  as  defined  and  supplied  by the Bank
for International  Settlements.
Among  the  host  country  variables,  we  include  the  real  GDP  growth,  the  change  in
country  risk  rating,  and  a  crisis  indicator.  Growth  figures  come  from  the  IMF  International
Financial  Statistics.  The  credit  rating  we  include  is  reported  by  Institutional  Investor
Magazine.  18 19 The crisis indicator  is a dummy variable which equals  one if host country i had a
crisis (banking,  currency,  or both)  in a  given  period.  A chronology  of crises  in the  region was
obtained  from  Caprio  and  Klingebiel  (1999)  and  Bordo  et  al.  (2001).20  We  interact  these
variables with a measure of exposure  to examine the responsiveness  to host shocks as  exposure
increases.  Exposure represents  the  ratio  of country j  claims  on country  i over the  total  claims
extended  by  country j.  This  ratio  is  calculated  from  the  BIS  consolidated  banking  statistics.
Finally,  because  foreign  bank  claims  are reported in dollars,  we also control  for changes  in the
exchange rate vis-a-vis the dollar for each home and host country.
In  principle,  given  the  importance  of foreign  lending  to  the  region,  changes  in  such
claims  could affect host country right hand side variables  (e.g.:  host real  GDP growth, timing of
crises, and credit rating) implying a potential  endogeneity  problem.  We believe that the concern
regarding  endogeneity  is  perhaps  overstated  since  our  estimations  focus  on  bilateral  lending
17 The U.K.  is the exception where  data on private sector claims are only available  for the period 1993-2000.
'1 Institutional  Investor Magazine publishes a semi-annual  survey of country credit ratings.  The magazine surveys
bankers,  money managers,  and economists around the world on their evaluations  of the relative risk of countries to
which they lend.  On the basis of their responses,  they produce a rating from 0 to 100, with higher numbers
representing a better repayment  capacity.
19 In alternative  specifications that are not shown but are available upon request we replace  the credit risk rating for a
number of macro variables (government deficit, current account deficit, real exchange rate appreciation,  anong
others) that serve as proxies for country risk. Given that results were very similar,  we prefer this more parsimonious
s'pecification.
2  See Table A.l for a list of crises in each host country during  1985-2000.
12flows  (i.e.,  changes  in  real  claims  from  home  country j  on host  country  i)  and  no  bilateral
relationship  seems  important  enough  to  warrant  such  concern.  Tables  A.4  and  A.5  in  the
Appendix  illustrate  that  when  expressed  as  either  a  percentage  of  domestic  credit  or  as  a
percentage  of total BIS lending to each  host,  these bilateral  lending shares  are relatively  small.
Nonetheless, as a precaution, all right hand side variables are lagged one period.
Home real  GDP growth and real interest rates  are included to control  for home  country
shocks.  Both of these  variables  come  from the IMF  International  Financial  Statistics.  Finally,
AOprivateclaims  it-,  is the lagged change  in private  claims from banks  in country j to  all (non-
BIS reporting) countries  other than i between period t-I  and t. This variable is calculated  on the
basis  of the  BIS  consolidated  banking  statistics  and  is  intended  to  examine  the  impact  of
spillover effects from portfolio  changes in other countries.
Equation (1)  above  includes  both home and host country  individual  effects  a&o  and a'i;
and allows the coefficients  to vary depending on the home  country or lender (this explains the j
superscript  in all coefficients).2'  However,  it is possible that different  lenders react  similarly to
host and even home  country shocks.  Below, we test different restricted versions of equation (1)
to arrive  at a final  specification  that constrains  the  impact of certain variables  to be  the  same
across home and host countries.
Home  country  economic  conditions  could  have  both a  negative  or positive  impact  on
foreign bank lending to host countries.  On the one hand, adverse  economic conditions and a lack
of profit opportunities  at home could encourage  banks to lend abroad. If this were the case,  we
would expect to find a negative  coefficient  on home  growth.  On the other hand, a recession  at
home could lead to a deterioration in the capital of foreign banks and an overall retrenchment  in
lending at home  and abroad.  We therefore  remain agnostic regarding  the  sign of this variable.
13While  we  are  interested  in  whether  our  results  are  in  line  with  those  obtained  by  other
researchers,  given  our  cross-country  dataset  and  analysis  we  are  also  interested  in  whether
different home country banks behave  in a similar fashion or not with respect to home growth.
Low real  interest rates  in lender  countries  tend to signal  periods  of excess  liquidity  and
portfolio  theory  would  suggest  that this  would  increase  banks'  willingness  to  lend  via  riskier,
higher interest rate  loans to developing  countries.  During these episodes,  foreign banks are more
likely to search for lending opportunities  abroad.  Therefore, we expect home real interest  rates to
have a negative impact on the change in claims.
Foreign  banks  are  less  likely to  extend credit  abroad if the  riskiness  of the  host country
worsens.  An  increase  in risk (lower  host  growth  or  a rating  downgrade)  should then  lead  to  a
rebalancing  within the loan portfolio away  from the affected country.  Hence, we  expect  to find  a
positive coefficient on growth and rating.
A priori,  we  might expect  banking,  currency,  and/or  twin  crisis  episodes  in  a particular
host country to be  accompanied  by a  decline  in  foreign bank lending,  since these  episodes  are
typically  associated  with  a  fall  in  the  capacity  of  crises-stricken  countries  to  repay  their
obligations.  On  the  other  hand,  foreign  banks  might  view  crises  in  host  countries  as  an
opportunity  to expand their operations  and  increase their market share locally.  Also, crises might
coincide  with a deterioration  in economic  fundamentals  like  GDP  growth  making their  impact
indistinguishable  from  other  cyclical  downturns.  In  other  words,  it  is  possible  that  the  crisis
dummy in our regressions  may not  be significant because  the impact of these  episodes  is being
captured  by changes  in GDP growth.  This in turn would  suggest that crises are not perceived  as
different  from any other cyclical  downturn in output.
21We could have also allowed coefficients  to vary by host country i but since host country dummies were not
individually significant we decided against this.
14As  we  discussed  above,  shocks  to  the  value  of an  asset  or  assets  within  the  lending
portfolio  of foreign  banks,  may  result  in a reduction  (or  increase,  depending  on  the  type  of
shock)  across  all  risky  claims.  Adapting  this  idea to  our application,  we  should  then  find  a
positive  and  significant  coefficient  relating  the  change  in  claims  on  country  i  from  country j
banks to the change in all other claims of country j banks.
Following  Calvo  and  Mendoza  (2000),  if country j  banks  have  a  higher  exposure  to
country i, then they should have greater incentives to learn and hence should provide more stable
financing.  To test this proposition,  we interact  the host country  variables  (the change  in rating,
the  real  growth,  and  the  crisis  indicator  for host  country  i,  respectively)  with  the exposure  of
country j  banks to country  i.  A priori, if indeed  higher exposure  is  translated  into  more  stable
financing,  we  expect these  interaction  terms  to be  opposite  in sign to that of the host country
shock.  For example,  we expect  the interaction  between  host growth (or changes  in host rating)
and exposure to be negative and the interaction between host crisis and exposure to be positive.
To deepen  our understanding  of the determinants  of foreign  bank lending,  we estimate
some  modified versions  of equation  (1).  First,  we examine  whether  banks'  responsiveness  to
shocks  depends  on  the  type  of shock  by  allowing  the  coefficients  in  equation  (1)  to  vary
depending  on  whether  the  change  in host  real  GDP,  host  rating,  and the  change  in all  other
claims  is positive or negative22. Also, because  in the  late  1990s,  foreign banks  increased  their
lending on-shore relative to the previous decade  and this might have affected how banks respond
to home and host shocks,  we estimate equation (1) over both sub-samples (1985-94)  and (1995-
2000) and examine whether banks' responsiveness to home and host variables changed over this
period.
22  We do not investigate positive/negative  home growth shocks, because for the seven home countries we  focus on,
there have been virtually no years in which home growth has been negative.
15Finally,  in  order  to  summarize  the  importance  of home  country,  host  country,  and
portfolio  shocks,  we  report  for  each  estimation  the  percentage  of the  variance  of  claims
explained  by  each  of these  factors.  To  the  extent  that  home  country  and  portfolio  shocks,
dominate host country shocks, we would be inclined to conclude that foreign banks facilitate  the
transmission of external shocks.
IV. Empirical Results
Table  3 presents  the  unrestricted  version  of equation (1),  where  the  coefficients  on all
variables  are  allowed  to  differ across  home  or lender  countries.  In general,  all  banks  respond
positively to improvements in host country economic  conditions, such as an increase  in real GDP
growth and an upgrade  in the credit risk rating. In particular,  these factors  are significant in the
case  of Japan,  Spain,  and the  U.S..  Also,  foreign  banks tend to increase  their lending  abroad
when opportunities  at  home  dwindle.  This is  illustrated  by the  negative  sign on home  growth
across all lenders,  except Japan.  Home growth is negative and statistically  significant for France
and the US. Tighter monetary conditions at home result in less lending abroad, as shown by the
negative coefficients  on home real interest rates.  Yet, this variable  appears to be significant only
for  Japan.  Like  Goldberg  (2001),  we  find  that  controlling  for  other  factors  reflecting  host
economic  conditions,  crises  in host  countries  do  not lead  to reductions  in lending  across  the
board.  The  sign  on this  coefficient  varies  depending  on the  lender  or home  country,  but  this
variable  is  never  significant.  In general,  a shock  to the rest of the  portfolio  is transmitted  to
individual host countries  in Latin America.  This  is illustrated by the positive coefficient  on all
other claims. Finally, it seems that in general,  the higher the exposure  of a lender to a given host
country,  the  smaller  the  reaction  to  host  country  shocks,  as  evidenced  by the mostly  negative
coefficient on the interaction terms between host growth and host credit rating with exposure.
16A cursory  look at the results from the unrestricted  model suggests that banks in home or
lender countries respond similarly to certain  shocks, not just in sign but also in magnitude.  Thus,
Table  4,  reports  F-tests  for a number  of cross-lender  restrictions.  To  summarize,  we find that
banks  in  home  or  lender  countries  respond  similarly  to  host  country  shocks,  exchange  rate
changes,  and portfolio  shocks.  In other  words,  we  cannot  reject  the joint  hypotheses  that  the
coefficients  on host growth, on the interaction between host growth and exposure,  on the change
in ratings, on the  interaction  between change  in ratings and exposure,  on the crisis dummy,  on
the  interaction  between  crisis  and  exposure,  and finally,  on the host  country  dummies  are  the
sarne  across  home  or lender  countries.  Furthermore,  we  also  cannot  reject  the hypothesis  that
exchange rate changes affect all lenders in the same way.
Table  5 shows the results  from estimating the  selected restricted model  (i.e.,  model (4.3)
in Table 4) for the  overall  sample  1985-2000  and  for the sub-samples  1985-94 and  1995-2000.
The  first  column  of Table  5 (model  5.1)  presents  our preferred  model  for the  whole  sample
period.  Focusing  on the  subset  of home  country  ()  variables,  we  find  that France,  Germany,
Spain, the UK, and the U.S. reduce claims  in response to increased profit opportunities  at home
(i.e.,  in  response  to  higher  home  growth),  but  only  the  coefficient  on  U.S.  home  growth  is
significant  with a negative  sign.  Home  growth has a positive  and significant  effect for Canada
and  Japan.  With  the  exception  of Germany  and  the  UK,  the home  real  interest  rate  has  the
expected negative impact. This variable is statistically significant for Canada, Japan, and the US.
Among the subset of host country variables, we find that the coefficient on host growth is
positive  and  significant,  showing  support  for the  idea  that  foreign  banks  do  respond  to host
country growth, increasing  and decreasing  credit over the cycle.  However, we also find strong
support  for a "Calvo-Mendoza"  effect,  such that the higher the exposure  of home  country j  to
host country  i, the less pro-cyclical  (the  less  sensitive  to host growth)  is foreign  bank  lending.
17The  coefficient  on host credit  rating  is positive  and  significant,  while  the  interaction  term  of
rating  with  exposure  is negative,  but not  significant.  Controlling  for host country growth  and
risk rating,  the crisis variable is not significant. Therefore,  it does not appear that crisis episodes
cause  any further decline in foreign bank claims.23 Finally, the coefficient on private claims on
other  countries  is positive  and  significant,  indicating that changes  elsewhere  in the portfolio of
lending banks might affect individual host countries.
Between  1985-2000,  foreign bank  penetration  (the  participation of foreign  banks in the
local  banking  market)  in  Latin  America  increased  significantly.  Indeed  while  locally  funded
foreign bank  loans  (in local  or foreign currency)  accounted  for some  15  percent of total lending
by banks  operating  in the  region  in  1995,  this  figure  had  risen  to  38  percent  by  200024.  We
investigate  whether  the  responsiveness  of  foreign  banks  changed  as  their  brick  and  mortar
investment (or local claims) in these countries increase by comparing the estimates of our model
over the two sub-samples,  namely, 1985-94 and 1995-2000.
Over  the  period  1985-1994,  host  real  growth  plays  a  significant  role  in  explaining
movements  in  real  claims.  While  the  coefficient  on  home  country  real  interest  rates  remains
negative  and significant,  there  is not much  evidence  that claims  respond  to home  growth.  The
coefficient  on  the  dummy  variable  capturing  crises  in  the  host  country  appears  large  and
negative,  but is insignificant.25 Finally, the coefficient on the change  in real  claims on all other
countries  is  both  positive  and  significant  indicating  that  changes  in  claims  on  specific  host
countries are affected by across the board changes in the international portfolio.
23 This result is independent of whether we include the crisis dummy contemporaneously  instead of lagged (see
Table A.6) and it also holds when we discriminate between banking, currency,  and twin crises (see Table A.7).
24 Salomon Smith Barney (2000).
25 This result continues to hold over the period 1985-1994 even when we include the crisis dummy
contemporaneously  or if we include  separate dummies to identify banking, currency,  and twin crises  (see Tables A.6
and A.7).
18Over  the  period  1995-2000,  which  coincides  with  the  increase  in  brick  and  mortar
operations of foreign  banks  in the region,  we find that banks do not seem to pull out from host
countries  in  crises.  The  coefficient  on  the  crisis  dummy  is  smaller  in magnitude,  and  also
insignificant.26 Also, over this period, in contrast to the findings for the previous period, there is
no  significant  evidence  that  changes  in  claims  to  other  countries  are  transmitted  to  the  host
countries we focus on. Changes in credit ratings have a positive and significant impact on foreign
bank  lending,  but  foreign  banks'  responsiveness  to  this  variable  decreases  as  the  degree  of
exposure rises.
Not only is it possible  that foreign  banks respond differently  to home  and host country
economic  conditions  as the  type of exposure  to the region changes,  but it is  also feasible  that
their reaction depends  asymmetrically on the nature of the shocks.  In order to test this formally,
we discriminate between positive and negative  changes  in host GDP growth, host credit ratings,
and in all other claims.27 Table 6 presents the results from this estimation for the overall sample,
1985-2000.  Note  that we define  negative  changes  in absolute  terms  so that we  can  interpret  a
negative coefficient as stating that larger drops in the variable in question lead to a decline in the
growth of claims.
The  results  in Table  6 have  some  interesting  interpretations.  Specifically  we  find  that
while positive changes in host real GDP growth continue to have a positive and significant sign,
the coefficient on negative host GDP growth is negative but not significant.  The same is true for
credit ratings:  claims respond to upgrades and not to downgrades in credit ratings.  However, the
higher the  exposure to the host country,  the smaller the response of claims to upgrades in credit
ratings,  as indicated  by the  significant and negative  coefficient  on the interaction  term between
26 As with the findings for the overall sample and the pre-1995  period, the results do not change if we enter the crisis
dummy contemporaneously  or if we analyze the impact of banking, currency, and twin crises, separately (see Tables
A.6 and A.7).
19upgrades and exposure.  On the other hand,  both positive  and negative changes in other country
claims  are  statistically  significant;  negative  changes  have  a  much  stronger  impact  on  private
claims  than  do  positive  changes,  and  that  difference  is  statistically  significant  at  standard
significance levels.  One interpretation of these results is that banks are more discriminate  in the
'good times'  than in the  'bad times'.  In other words,  during periods of positive growth,  banks
appear to increase claims more related to individual host country growth performance  whereas in
periods  of negative  growth,  banks  seem  to  retrench  lending  more  across  the  board  than  in
accordance with individual country factors.28
A  useful  way  of summarizing  the  importance  of home,  host,  and  portfolio  shocks  is
provided in Table  7, which details the percentage of the variance  in private claims explained by
each of these  groups of variables.  In other words,  for each group  of variables,  we compute  the
increase in the R-squared,  as a proportion of the total variance of the percentage change in claims
explained  by all  variables.  We  rescale  the  percentage  explained  by each  group  of variables  so
that the sum of all three adds to  100.
We find that while changes  in claims on all other countries explain a significant  amount
of the variance in the dependent variable (21%) in the 1985-1994 period, they practically play no
role in explaining changes  in private sector  claims on host countries  in Latin America during the
later period.  In addition, while home country conditions  explain a large proportion (62%) of the
variance  in  private  claims  during  the  1985-1994  sub-period,  their  importance  declines
significantly in the latest sub-period.  Host country  conditions explain between 20 and 50 percent
of the  variance  in claims  in both periods,  and,  overwhelningly,  it is positive changes  (positive
27  See footnote 22.
28 One possible interpretation of this result is that investors facing margin calls when a negative shock takes place in
a particular country  might engage in an indiscriminate  reduction in their international  portfolio. We thank Enrique
Mendoza for this observation.
20growth and credit rating upgrades) that play the most significant role in explaining the changes in
international  financial claims.
V. Conclusions
In  this  paper,  we  employ  a  comprehensive  dataset  to  address  a number  of questions
related  to the stability  of foreign bank claims.  The  data set is rich in two dimensions.  From  a
cross-sectional  perspective,  we  capture  the behavior  of banks  from  different  home  countries.
Banks  from these  countries vary in both their degree  of exposure and  in their importance  as a
source  of credit to Latin  America and to the particular host countries  we analyze.  From a time-
series  perspective,  our dataset allows  us to focus on periods of tranquility  as well as periods  of
crisis; on  periods  of lower  foreign  bank penetration  and  periods  of strong  "mortar and brick"
(local)  presence.  With this more general  dataset,  we confirm particular previous  findings  in the
literature, but more importantly we offer a set of new results.
In particular,  we  find that banks transmit shocks  from their home countries  and changes
in their claims  on  other countries  spill  over to  individual hosts.  However,  both the  regression
results and the variance  decompositions  over the sub-periods  1985-1994 and 1995-2000  indicate
that  foreign  bank  lending  has  become  less  "indiscriminate"  and  more  responsive  to  host
conditions  over time.  The responsiveness  to the latter becomes  less  "pro-cyclical"  as exposure
increases.  Finally, foreign bank lending reacts more to positive than to negative host shocks and
is not significantly  curtailed during crises. 29
29  It would be interesting  to consider if the Argentine  crisis,  which unfolded as  we wrote  this paper,  is in line  or
might  change  the nature  of our results.  Recent  (Ql  2002) BIS  data indicate  almost  a  35%  fall  in  international
private  sector claims to Argentina  over the previous  12  months as growth has  dived and,  given default, the ratings
variable  collapsed.  However,  as  BIS  (2002)  points out,  a  substantial  part of this  fall  is a result  of the forced
"pessification"  of local dollar lending.  The BIS data does not disaggregate the impact of this exceptional event from
a real cancellation  of claims  implying that it is impossible  to compare  the model's predictions  with reality  in this
case.  It is also  interesting  to point out that, more recently,  the vast majority of foreign banks  (the only exceptions
21We  conclude  that  while  foreign  banks  have  the  potential  of importing  home  country
shocks  and  shocks  from  elsewhere  through  overall  shifts  in  their  international  portfolio,  on
balance  they continue to lend during crises, they have become more discriminate  over time, and
become less pro-cyclical  as their exposure levels to a particular host country rise.
being Scotia Bank of Canada and Credit Agricole of France that were suspended) have injected new funds  into their
local  affiliates consistent with the Central Bank's assistance strategy.
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23Figure 1:
Real lending by banks from 7 BIS-reporting countries to the private sector in Latin America30
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Figure 2:
Private sector claims  from banks in 7 BIS -reporting countries to Latin America3l
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Source: authors'  calculation based on BIS data.
30 The 7 BIS  lender countries  are: Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, UK, and US. Latin America here refers
to the ten  largest countries  in the region:  Argentina,  Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,  Mexico, Peru,
Uruguay,  and Venezuela.
31  See footnote 30.
24Figure 3:
Private sector claims from banks in 7 BIS-reporting countries to Latin America32
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Figure 4:
Average share of lending from BIS 7 banks to countries  in Latin America33
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32  See footnote 30.
33 See  footnote 30.
25Figure 5: Private sector claims on Latin America34
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Figure 6:
Private sector claims from banks in 7 BIS lenders on Latin America35
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34  See  footnote 30.
35  See footnote 30.
26Table 1: Impact of crises on the growth rate of real domestic and foreign credit
This table reports the average  growth of foreign and domestic credit during tranquil and crisis periods.  T-tests are
shown for the difference  in average growth between these two periods.  Tests reported  are one-sided, where the null
is: mean(tranquil  period)-mean(crisis  period)=-0  and the alternative  is: mean(tranquil)-mean(crisis)>0.  BIS 7 reflects
the growth of lending by all 7 lenders combined.  Real domestic credit refers to the growth of lending by all financial
institutions operating in the 10 host countries.
Claims from:  Im  act of host crises  Crises in other de  eloping countries
Mean t-test  Mean t-test  Mean t-test
Tranqi  Host crisis (p-value)  Russian crisis (p-value)  Asian crisis (p-value)
BIS 7  11.14  2.05  1.95  29.57  -2.09  26.53  -1.61
(0.03)  (0.98)  (0.95
Canada  25.49  8.96  0.81  132.44  -2.56  64.92  -0.85
(0.21  (0.99)  (0.80
France  3.19  -1.42  1.05  20.17  -2.05  13.12  -1.09
(0.15  (0.98)  (0.86)
Germany  14.02  4.16  1.37  25.72  -0.81  40.26  -1.71
(0.09  (0.79)  (0.96
Japan  10.52  17.33  -0.61  37.01  -1.36  41.63  -1.48
(0.73  (0.91)  (0.93
Spain  28.64  20.10  0.63  35.93  -0.26  77.19  -1.61
(0.26  (0.60)  (0.94
UK  29.46  9.26  1.17  73.74  -1.77  24.62  0.19
(0.12)  (0.96)  (0.43)
US  12.31  3.01  1.37  31.16  -1.58  -1.11  1.04
(0.09)  (0.94)  (0.15
Real domestic credit  10.67  -5.44  2.74  15.72  -0.49  17.01  -0.58
___  __  __  __  __  __  __  ____  __  __  (0.01'  _  _  _  _  _  (0.69)  _  _  _  _  (0.72
Table 2: Comparing means and standard deviations of foreign vis-i-vis  domestic  credit
This table reports the mean and standard deviation of the growth of foreign and domestic  credit during the entire
sample and during crisis periods. T-tests are shown for the difference in mean and standard deviation between BIS 7
and domestic credit.  BIS 7 reflects the growth of lending by all 7 lenders  combined. Real domestic credit refers to
the  growth of lending by all financial institutions operat ng in the 10 host countries.
BIS-7 Real Claims  Real Domestic Credit  Difference  Tests
Standard
Mean test  deviation
Standard  Standard  statistic  test statistic
Mean  deviation  Mean  deviation  (p-value)  (p-value)
Host Crisis  2.05  20.79  -5.44  36.3  -1.13  3.16
(0.13'1  (0.00
Asian Crisis  26.53  30.09  17.01  11.28  -0.86  0.1
(0.21)  (0.98
Russian Crisis  29.57  11.98  15.72  23.30  -1.43  3.78
_  _  _  _  _  _(0.10)  (0.05
1985-2000  8.58  25.41  6.15  32.67  -0.76  1.65
_ _ _ _ _ _ __-(0.45)  (0.00'
27Table 3: Unrestricted model  of the determinants of foreign  bank lending to Latin America
This table presents the results of estimating equation  I)  for the change  in real  rivate sector claims. Regression  coefficients  are allowed to be different across  Ienders.
Variable  Coefficiend  t-statistic  Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic
Host real GDP growth j,,_O  x Canada  0.561  0.14  (Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) ,- x Japan  0.248  0.42
Host real GDP growth j,,  ux France  0.760  0.84  (Local currency j / US$ exchange rate),., x Spain  0.951  0.87
Host real GDP growth 1,.i  x Germany  1.101  0.72  (Local currency j / USS exchange rate)  -I  x UK  6.953  1.15
Host real GDP growth j,tX  x Japan  2.316  2.00  **  Change in host rating i.l x  Canada  2.852  1.20
Host real GDP growth i,,  x Spain  4.203  1.93  *  Change in host rating  tij x  France  -0.779  -2.39
Host real GDP growth j,.l x UK  3.435  0.76  Change in host rating it_ x Germany  0.170  0.35
Host real GDP growth  t. 1x US  2.414  2.61  *"  Change in host rating i,,n x Japan  1.537  2.27
Ilost real GDP growth j,u x Exposure to i xCanada  -0.011  -0.02  Change in host  rating ij- 1 x Spain  1.207  1.12
Host real GDP growthi,, i x Exposure  to i  x France  -0.199  -0.88  Change  in host rating 4,,1  x UK  0.919  0.37
Host real GDP growth i.t-  x Exposure to i x  Germany  -0.112  -0.62  Change  in host rating i,_a  x US  1.735  3.35  ...
ost real GDP growth i,  u x Exposure to i x Japan  -4.349  -2.43  *  Change inhost rating .i  a x Exposure to i x Canada  -0.313  -1.16
ost real  GDP growth  n  x Exposure to i x  Spain  -0.285  -1.22  Change  in host rating ito x Exposure to i x France  0.224  2.54
ost real  GDP growth i,,- x Exposure to i  x UK  -0.599  -0.24  Change  in host rating ,tl x Exposure to i x Germany  -0.009  -0.13
ost real  GDP growthi.,n  x Exposure  to i x  US  -0.160  -1.16  Change in host rating in x Exposure to i x Japan  -0.127  -0.17
Home real GDP growth j,,,  Xx Canada  3.358  0.67  Change in host rating,.,  x  Exposure to i x  Spain  -0.172  -1.18
ome real GDP growthj.,., x France  -4.572  -2.43  t  Change in host rating i,_,  x Exposure to i x UK  -0.983  -0.61
ome real GDP growth j, 3 X  x  Germany  -3.492  -1.31  Change in host rating ijn xExposure to i x US  -0.050  -0.82
ome real GDP growth.i- x Japan  5.725  1.87  *  Change in private real claims on all other countries t.n  x Canada  1.632  1.95
ome real GDP growth j,t,X  x  Spain  -3.618  -0.65  Change in private real claims on all other countries,.,  x France  -0.011  -0.03
ome real GDP growth;.,o  x UK  -17.058  -1.32  Change in private real claims on all other countries ,.,  x Germany  0.501  1.46
Home real GDP growth j,n x US  -5.564  -2.08  **  Change in private real claims on all other countries,.1 x Japan  0.132  2.29
Home real  Interest Rate j.,.l x Canada  -0.167  -0.03  Change  in private real  claims on  all other countries.,  x  Spain  -0.214  -0.68
Home real Interest Rate j.,,l x France  -0.188  -0.10  Change  in private real claims on all other countries,,l x UK  2.048  1.43
Home real Interest Rate j,m x  Germnany  2.640  0.85  Change in private real claims on all other countries,.,  x US  0.583  2.41
ome real Interest  Rate j.1 .x  x Japan  -12.073  -2.16  "  Host crisis dummy  it,n x Canada  9.459  0.48
ome real Interest Rate j,,X  x Spain  -1.263  -0.44  Host crisis dummy j,,.X  x France  -6.435  -0.92
ome real Interest Rate jj-1  x UK  -16.455  -0.64  Host crisis dummyj,,_ 1 x Germany  -6.303  -0.72
ome real Interest Rate 1j,,. x US  -0.679  -0.19  Host crisis dummy j  ,-l  x Japan  5.304  0.26
Local currency i / US$ exchange rate),-  x Canada  -0.0 14  -0.25  Host crisis dummy j,,.1  x Spain  16.369  0.79
Local currency  i / USS exchange  rate)  X1  x France  -0.004  -0.15  Host crisis dummy ,. x UK  -38.074  -0.75
Local currency  i / US$ exchange rate),-,  x Germany  -0.009  -0.39  Host crisis dummy, ln  l x US  -15-390  -1.53
Local currency i / US$ exchange  rate),.1 x Japan  0.033  1.23  Host crisis dummy ij.1  x Exposure  to i x Canada  2.375  0.53
Local  currency i / US$ exchange  rate) 1.  x  Spain  0.060  1.20  Host crisis dummy i,,.-  x Exposure  to i x  France  -1.605  -0.73
(Local  currency i / USS exchange  rate), . x UK  -0.135  -0.40  Host crisis dummy ij.1  x Exposure  to i x  Germnany  -0.469  -0.36
Local  currency i / US$  exchange rate),  x US  0.049  2.09  H  |  ost crisis dummy nntI  x Exposure  to i x Japan  -4.761  -0.19
Local  currencyj / US$ exchange  rate),,  x Canada  -1.278  -0.51  Host crisis dummy j,,.  x Exposure  to i x  Spain  0.017  0.00
Local  currency j / US$ exchange  rate),-,  x France  0.491  1.79  H  Host crisis dummy n, x Exposure  to i x UK  12.441  0.35
Local  currency j / US$ exchange  rate),-,  x Germany  0.342  0.79  Host crisis dummy i,. 2 x Exposure  to i x US  1.152  0.82
umber of observations  804
Adjusted  R-squared  0.11
**,**  ~denote significance  at 10,  5, and  I percent, respectively.  Home  and host dummies  are included  but not shown. t-statistics are calculated  on the basis of robust
standard errors.
28rable 4: F-tests for coefficient  restrictions across home countries or lenders
This table reports F-tests for different coefficient restrictions  across home countries, based on the results presented  in Table 3.
F-test of coefficient
Restricted Coefficients  Unrestricted Coefficients  restrictions
Model  4.1
Host real GDP growth  i  Home real GDP growth j11  F( 96,  658) =  1.14
Host real GDP growth it-l  x Exposure to i  Home real Interest Rate  Prob> F =  0.1785
(Local  currency i / US$ exchange rate) ,-,  (Local currency j / US$ exchange rate),,
Change  in host rating it-l  Change in private real claims on all other countries ,-
Change in host rating i,t-  x Exposure to i  Home dummies
Host crisis dummy i.t.l
Host crisis dummy jt l x Exposure to i
Host dummies
Model  4.2
Host real GDP growth i  Home real GDP  growth t  F(101,  658)=  1.10
Host real GDP growth  i  x Exposure to i  Home real  Interest Rate 1j,,1 Prob > F =  0.2559
(Local currency i / US$ exchange  rate)  Change in private real claims on all other countries ,-
Change in host rating i,t-  Home dummies
Change in host rating it-l  x Exposure to i
Host crisis  dummy  ti-I
Host crisis dummy  i,t-I x Exposure to i
Host dummies
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate)  -l
Model 4.3
Host real GDP growth i  t_j  Home real GDP growth it-l  F(107,  658)=  1.14
Host real GDP growth it-l  x Exposure to i  Home real  Interest Ratej,t-l  Prob > F =  0. 1793
(Local  currency i / US$ exchange  rate) ,.  Home dummies
Change  in host rating it-l
Change in host rating it-l  x Exposure to i
Host crisis dummy  j,  _
Host crisis dummy j,it1 x Exposure to i
Host dummies
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) ,-,
Change in private real  claims on all other countries  l
Model  4.4
Host real GDP growth it-l  Home real GDP growth i  F(l 12,  658)  =  1.20
Host real GDP growth it-l x Exposure to i  Home dummies  Prob > F  0.0916*
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate)  I
Change in host rating it-l
Change  in host rating it-  x Exposure to i
Host crisis dummy it-.
Host crisis dummy  ijtl. x Exposure to i
Host dummies
(Local currency j / US$ exchange rate) ,-
Change in private real claims on all other countries t-X
Home real Interest Ratej,.l
denote significance  at  10, 5,  and  I percent,  respectively.
29Table 5: Restricted model for the determinants of foreign bank lending to Latin America
This table reports the estimates from the selected model according  to the F-tests reported in Table 4. Model
(5.1)  presents the results for the model estimated over the period 1985-2000.  Model (5.2)  refers to the results
obtained for the pre-1995  period, while model (5.3)  p esents the estimates for the  1995-2000 subsample.
Variable  Model 5.1  Model 5.2  Model  5.3
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
(t-statistic)  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)
Host real GDP growth i  2.120  *  2.244  1  1.157
(2.900)  (2.990)  (0.730)
Host real GDP growth i-j x Exposure to i  -0.210 **  -0.242 **  0.050
-(2.120)  -(2.340)  (0.230)
Home real  GDP growth j, I x Canada  8.544*+  1.942  -6.327
(2.010)  (0.550)  -(0.290)
Home real  GDP growth j,t  x France  -1.759  -3.501  -1.953
-(0.860)  -(1.490)  -(0.380)
Home real  GDP growthj,tl  x Gennany  -2.140  -2.822  -22.063
-(0.840)  -(1.050)  -(1.600)
Home  real GDP growthj,  x Japan  5.370*  -0.809  11.884**
(1.670)  -(0.250)  (2.460)
Home  real GDP growth j,,  x Spain  -4.815  -2.185  -4.579
-(0.720)  -(0.300)  -(0.280)
Home  real GDP growth j, l x UK  -2.928  -8.975
-(0.180)  -(0.510)
Home  real GDP growth 1,l  x US  -5.399**  -10.331 *  -1.623
-(2.200)  -(3.760)  -(0.190)
Home real interest rate j, I x Canada  -15.551 *  -7.299 *  -6.610
-(3.520)  -(1.820)  -(0.400)
Home  real interest rate j,,  x France  -0.204  -1.631  -11.591*
-(0.130)  -(0.410)  -(1.650)
Home real interest rate j,t-l x Germany  0.468  4.859  -7.393
(0.170)  (1.230)  -(0.400)
Home real interest  ratej,,l  x Japan  -11.248  -11.576  -9.544
-(2.090)  -(1.010)  -(0.860)
Home real interest  rate j,,  x Spain  -0.458  1.160  55.259 **
-(0.180)  (0.460)  (2.660)
Home real interest rate j,t  x UK  17.733  17.890
(1.070)  (0.940)
Home real interest  rate j,, x US  -7.122 ***  -8.053 *  1.028
-(2.740)  (3.030)  (0.110)
(Local  currency i / US$ exchange rate),,  0.010  0.023  -0.152
(0.730)  (1.590)  -(1.230)
(Local currency j / US$  exchange rate),,  0.393  0.768  "  -0.714
(1.380)  (2.150)  -(0.810)
Change in host rating i  1.142*4  0.062  2.279
(2.460)  (0.210)  (1.960)
Change in host rating  x  x Exposure to i  -0.093  0.029  -0.380 *
-(1.490)  (0.560)  -(2.150)
Change  in private real  claims on  all other  countries-,  0.146*4.  0.130 +  0.347
(3.130)  (2.200)  (0.680)
Host crisis dummy i  -3.409  -6.855  -0.639
-(0.640)  -(1.190)  -(0.060)
Host crisis dummy j,_l  x Exposure to i  0.760  0.013  0.349
(__  _ _ _  __ _  _ _  0.660)  (0.010)  (0. 180)
Number of observations  804  426  378
Adjusted R-squared  0.13  0.10  0.19
t-statistics  are in parentheses  (calculated on the basis of robust standard errors).  *,*  *,***  denote
significance  at 10,  5, and  I percent, respectively.  Home dummies are included, but not shown. UK is
omitted  in Model (5.2), because  data on private sector claims  is not available  for the UK prior to  1993.
30Table 6: The impact of positive and negative shocks  on foreign bank lending to Latin America
This table presents the results from  a model where the impact of host GDP changes, rating changes, and
hanges in all other claims is allowed to vary depending on the positive  or negative nature of the shocks.
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic
Positive host real  GDP growth  j,,l  1.679  1.68
Negative  host real GDP growth  i.tl  -2.179  -1.59
Positive host real GDP growth  ij-1 x Exposure to i  -0.016  -0.13
Negative host real GDP growth  i,t-1  x Exposure to i  0.358  1.46
Home real GDP growth j,t-1  x Canada  8.894  2.04
Home real GDP growthj 1.t  x France  -2.291  -1.09
Home real GDP growth j, 1 x Germany  -2.140  -0.86
Home real GDP growthj.t-l  x Japan  5.483  1.69
Home real GDP growth > I x Spain  -5.889  -0.87
Home real  GDP growth j,1  x UK  -1.136  -0.07
Home real  GDP growth >-  x US  -4.618  -1.87
Home real interest rate j,t_1  x  Canada  -14.433  -3.14
Home  real interest ratej,t-l  x France  -0.118  -0.07
Home  real interest rate j,1  x Germany  -0.333  -0.12
Home real interest ratej,t-l x Japan  -13.031  -2.43
Home  real interest rate j,,-l  x Spain  -0.110  -0.04
Home real interest rate j,t-l  x UK  21.010  1.20
Home  real interest rate j,t1l  x US  -5.372  -1.77
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) t,,  0.017  1.24
(Local currency j / US$  exchange rate) t-I  0.412  1.45
Host rating Upgrade  ,  t-l  1.665  1.88
Host rating Downgrade;,,  -0.036  -0.06
Host rating Upgrade  ,  x Exposure to i  -0.245  -2.53
Host rating Downgrade i, I x Exposure to i  -0.117  -2.11  1
Increase in private real claims on all other countries  ,  0.133  2.79
Decrease in private real claims on all other countries,,  -0.922  -1.99
Host crisis dummy i ,,  -5.385  -0.92
Host crisis dummy i,,-l x Exposure  to i  1.100  0.87
Number of observations  804
Adjusted R-squared  0.13
**,*** denote significance at  10, 5, and I percent, respectively. t-statistics are obtained on the basis of
robust standard errors.  Home dummies  are included, but not shown. Growth rates and changes in ratings
and claims are expressed in terms of absolute values.
31Table 7: Percentage  of variance  of foreign bank lending explained  by home, host, and portfolio shocks
This table reports the percentage of the variance  in foreign bank lending that can be explained by home, host, and portfolio shocks.
The percent variance explained is calculated as (R2_f,} - R2_w.,Z)/ R2__&,, * 100. The home country variables included are
real GDP growth, real interest rates, and the home/dollar exchange rate. Host country variables included are: real GDP growth,
credit rating, the host/dollar exchange  rate, and the crisis dummy.  Positive changes refer to credit rating upgrades, host positive
real GDP growth, and increases  in all other claims. Negative changes refer to credit rating downgrades, host negative  real GDP
growth, and decreases  in all other claims.  We re-scale the percent of the variance explained by each  set of variables  so that for a
given estimation the sum of all three groups  adds to  100
Home Countr  Variables  Host Countr  Variables  Change in all other claims
Entire Sample  46.78  31.41  21.81
Positive changes  28.43  6.39
59.45a
Negative changes  1.69  4.03
1985-1994  61.63  17.76  20.61
1995-2000  49.56  48.59  1.85
a  We are unable to split home variables into positive and negative sub-samples since between  1985-2000  there are no periods
when home variables  take negative values. So essentially the negative/positive  estimation corresponds to one where all variables
(host and all other claims) except for the home variables are split into positive  and negative changes (see Table  6).
32Table AJ:  Crises classification:  banking, currency, and twin crises in the 10 Latin American countries, 1985-2000
Host Country  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
Argentina  CC  BC, CC  BC  CC  BC,CC
Brazil  cc  BC, CC  BC  BC  BC  CC
C  hile  _  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  __  _  _
Colombia  BC  BC  BC  BC,CC
Costa Rica  BC  BC  BC  BC  BC
Ecuador  CC  CC  BC  BC  BC  BC,CC  BC
Mexico  CC  BC,CC BC, CC  BC  _
Peru  BC  BC  BC  BC,CC  BC, CC  CC  _
Uruguay  CC  I  _I
Venezuela  BC  BC, CC  CC  BC,CC  BC,CC  BC  BC
Note:  BC denotes banking crises, while CC denotes currency  crises.
Banking crises: chronology follows Caprio & Klingebiel (1999), which documents episodes  where much or all of bank capital was exhausted.
Currency crises: include episodes of forced changes in parity, abandonment  of fixed exchange rate regimes,  and those episodes identified by an index of
exchange  market pressure. The index is a standard deviation weighted average of exchange rate changes,  short-term  interest rate changes and reserve changes. A
currency crisis is recorded when the index exceeds the critical threshold of 1.5 standard deviations above its mean.
Twin crises: refers to episodes when banking and currency crises occur simultaneously.
33Table A.2:  Impact of crises on  the growth rate of real domestic  and foreign credit, by type of crisis and by lender
This table reports the average growth  of foreign and domestic credit during tranquil and crisis  periods. In particular,  we distinguish between  banking, currency,  and twin crises.  T-
tests are shown  for the difference in average  growth between these two periods. Tests reported are one-sided, where the null is:  mean(tranquil period)-mean(crisis  period)=0  and
the alternative is:  mean(tranquil)-mean(crisis)>0.  BIS 7 reflects the growth of lending by all 7 lenders  combined.  Real domestic credit refers to the growth of lending by all
financial  institutions operating  in the  10 host countries.
Claims from:  All Host Crises  Host Ban  ing Crises  Host Currency Crises  Host Twin Crises
Mean t-test  Mean t-test  Mean t-test  Mean t-test
Tranquil  Period  Host Crisis  (p-values)  Host Crisis  (p-values)  Host Crisis  (p-values)  Host Crisis  (p-values)
BIS-7  11.14  2.05  1.95  12.80  -0.18  -9.97  2.19  2.02  1.58
(0.03  (0.57)  (0.02)  (0.06
Canada  25.49  8.96  0.81  26.38  -0.02  -12.15  0.84  8.74  0.63
(0.21  (0.51)  (0.20  (0.26
France  3.19  -1.42  1.05  -4.09  0.92  -9.22  1.39  2.39  0.14
(0.15  (0.18)  (0.08  (0.44
Germany  14.02  4.16  1.3  4.52  0.70  -4.87  1.25  7.01  0.78
(0.09  (0.24)  (0.11)  (0.22
Japan  10.52  17.33  -0.61  49.76  -1.91  -2.81  0.65  9.18  0.11
(0.73  (0.97)  (0.26)  (0.46
Spain  28.64  20.10  0.63  49.33  -0.79  -3.68  1.09  14.63  0.81
(0.26  (0.79)  (0.14  (0.21
UK  29.46  9.26  1.17  15.48  0.45  -24.51  8.99  0.98
(0.12  (0.33)  (0.17
US  12.31  3.01  1.3  20.01  -0.64  1.10  0.84  -4.14  2.12
(0.09_  (0.74)  (0.20)  (0.02_
Real domestic credit  10.67  -5.44  2.74  -5.15  1.55  -2.55  1.13  -6.51  2.42
__(0.01_  _  _ _  _  _  (0.06)  (0.13)1  (0.01_
Note: no means test can be perforned for the UK for currency crises, because there is only I observation post  1993.
Table A.3:  Comparing means and standard deviations of foreign vis-a-vis  domestic credit, by type of crisis
This table reports the mean and standard deviation growth of foreign and domestic  credit during crisis periods.  In particular,  we distinguish between banking,
currency, and twin crises.  T-tests are shown  for the difference  in mean and standard deviation between BIS 7 and domestic credit.  BIS  7 reflects the growth of
lending by all 7 lenders combined.  Real domestic credit refers to the growth of lending by all financial  institutions operating  in the  10 host countries.
All Host Crises  Host B  nking Crises  Host Cu  rrency Crises  Host Twin Crises
Meana  Std De  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev
Real domestic credit  -5.44  36.37  -5.15  18.6  -2.55  52.77  -6.51  36.4
Real BIS-7 Claims  2.05  20.79  12.80  25.68  -9.97  14.33  2.02  18.53
Test Statistic  -1.13  3.16  -1.43  0.53  0.40  13.57  -1.02  3.87
P-value  (0.13)1  (0.00  (0.10)  (0.81  (0.35)  (0.00  (0. 16)  (0.00
aNull hypothesis:  Mean(Dom Credit)-Mean(BIS-7)=0;  Alternative  hypothesis: Mean(Dom Credit)-Mean(BIS-7)<0
bNul1  hypothesis:  sd(Dom Credit)=sd(BIS-7);  Alternative  hypothesis:  sd(Dom Credit)>sd(BIS-7)
2ATable A.4:  Claims from 7 home countries as a share of domestic  credit to private sector in the 10 host countries in Latin America, 198--zuuu  average
Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Costa Rica  Ecuador  Mexico  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela
Canada  1.05  0.45  0.70  0.62  2.59  0.17  2.20  0.62  0.14  1.47
France  5.15  3.56  2.23  6.17  1.50  2.91  11.28  11.21  1.62  15.36
Germany  5.75  2.43  3.07  4.30  5.32  2.33  4.34  2.69  3.47  7.18
Japan  2.09  1.03  1.201  1.83  1.33  1.33  3.38  1.79  0.15  2.22
Spain  4.76  0.33  3.91  3.80  3.54  1.22  2.29  7.13  5.39  2.95
UK  2.29  0.62  0.70  2.35  0.43  1.29  1.45  1.32  1.77  3.16
US  9.42  2.84  5.95  7.23  4.45  6.67  14.63  5.41  4.30  12.73
All 7 lenders  30.51  11.26  17.76  26.31  19.181  15.93  39.571  30.161  16.85  45.07
Table A.5:  Claims from 7 home countries  as a share of all BIS claims on the 10 host countries in Latin America, 1985-2000  average
Argentina  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Costa Rica  Ecuador  Mexico  Peru  Uruguay  Venezuela
Canada  2.19  2.80  2.32  1.76  9.51  0.64  3.01  1.36  0.46  2.49
France  13.17  22.31  9.63  19.20  7.29  12.35  17.26  27.54  6.97  25.59
Germany  14.29  15.02  12.72  12.49  16.38  10.27  6.85  7.06  10.52  11.52
Japan  5.46  6.94  5.271  5.09  5.56  5.25  5.77  3.02  0.67  3.731
Spain  10.13  2.14  16.18  8.96  15.32  4.87  5.10  17.74  20.82  4.57
UK  4.42  4.63  2.42  6.57  1.28  6.38  3.71  3.72  5.20  4.26
US  23.13  17.78  28.39  20.78  19.35  31.04  23.43  12.39  15.01  20.73
AI 7 lenders  72.79  71.62  76.94  74.86  74.69  70.79  65.13  72.83  59.65  72.90
35Table  A.6:  Restricted  model  for  the  determinants  of  foreign  bank  lending  to  Latin  America,
allowing  crises to affect lending contemporaneously
Model (A.6.1)  presents the results  for the model estimated  over the period  1985-2000.  Model  (A.6.2) refers  to  the
results obtained  for the pre-1995 period, while model (A.6.3) presents the estimates for the  1995-2000  subsample.
Model A.6.1  Model A.6.2  Model A.6.3
Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient
Variable  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)  (t-statistic)
Host real GDP growth  l  2.014 ***  2.289***  1.119
(2.760)  (3.080)  (0.670)
I-lost real GDP growth i  x Exposure  to i  -0.209 *  -0.318 ***  0.076
-(1.920)  -(3.080)  (0.350)
Home real GDP growth it- 1 x Canada  7.393 *  0.327  -7.220
(1.810)  (0.090)  -(0.330)
llome real GDP growthi,. 1 x France  -2.742  -3.576  -2.511
-(1.350)  -(1.550)  -(0.540)
ome real GDP growth  x Germany  -2.578  -3.550  -22.124 *
-(1.030)  -(1.270)  -(1.680)
Home real GDP growth 1 1 x Japan  5.413  -0.939  11.878 t
(1.570)  -(0.260)  (2.450)
Home real GDP growth j.  x Spain  -4.248  -1.030  -3.163
-(0.610)  -(0.140)  -(0.190)
Home real GDP growth j.1 x UIK  -1.983  -7.468
-(0.120)  -(0.420)
Home real GDP growth  jt.1  x US  -6.497**  -11.851  *  -1.333
-(2.630)  -(4.070)  -(0.170)
Home real interest rate  x Canada  -13.977 **  -6.095 *  -5.679
-(3.410)  -(1.670)  -(0.340)
ome real interest ratei,_ 1 x France  0.064  0.509  -10.930*
(0.040)  (0.140)  -(1.650)
Home real interest rate jt.i  x Germany  0.866  6.292  -6.595
(0.310)  (1.370)  -(0.360)
Home real interest rate j  l x Japan  -11.447  -12.116  -7.748
-(2.130)  -(1.060)  -(0.720)
Home real interest rate  x Spain  -0.208  1.165  57.405***
-(0.080)  (0.440)  (2.860)
Home real interest rate it- x UK  15.890  14.301
(0.960)  (0.740)
Home real interest rate j,,l xUS  -6.037**  -7.189*  2.733
-(2.290)  -(2.630)  (0.290)
(Local currency i / US$ exchange rate) ,  0.003  0.002  -0.002
(1.330)  (1.190)  -(0.250)
Local  currencyj / US$ exchange rate) t.,  0.387  0.833 **  -0.707
(1.370)  (2.390)  -(0.800)
Change  in host rating it-l  1.112**  0.014  2.356*
(2.390)  (0.050)  (2.100)
Change  in host rating i,-l  x Exposure to i  -0.112 *  0.023  -0.421 **
-(1.700)  (0.410)  -(2.270)
Change  in private real claims on all other  countriest. 1 0.155 ***  0.141 **  0.401
(3.290)  (2.400)  (0.790)
Host crisis dummy j,,  -4.817  -3.684  -13.423
-(0.860)  -(0.650)  -(1.300)
Host crisis dummy j, x Exposure to i  1.457 *  2.705  ***  2.372
(1.800)  (2.910)  (1.490)
umber of observations  805  420  385
-squared  0.1599  0.1516  0.2591
t-statistics are in parentheses  (calculated on the basis of robust standard errors).  *,*  *,***  denote
significance at  10, 5,  and I percent,  respectively.  Home dummies  are included,  but not shown. UK is
omitted in Model (A.6.2),  because data on private sector claims is not available for the UK prior to 1993.
36Table  A.7:  Restricted  model  for the  determinants  of  foreign  bank lending  to  Latin  America,
discriminating between  bankin  , currency, and twin crises, 1985-2000
Including  la  ed crisis dummies  IncludinR contemp  raneous crisis dummies
With Brazilian Crisis  Without Brazilian  Crisis  With Brazilian Crisis  Without Brazilian Crisis
(1999)  (1999)  (1999)  (1999)
Host real GDP growthi 1 2.102  2.107  1.891  1.928 *
(2.830)  (2.840)  (2.400)  (2.460)
ost real GDP growth  x Exposure  to i  -0.224 "  -0.222 *  -0.156  -0.158
-(2.270)  -(2.270)  -(1.270)  -(1.280)
Home real GDP growth it- x Canada  8.417  8.370**  8.065  8.082
(1.980)  (1.970)  (1.830)  (1.830)
ome real GDP growthj,  x France  -1.135  -1.120  -2.368  -2.430
-(0.550)  -(0.540)  -(1.120)  -(1.150)
Home real GDP growth j.,O  x Germany  -1.857  -1.874  -2.163  -2.231
-(0.730)  -(0.740)  -(0.800)  -(0.830)
Home real GDP growth  j.p.  x Japan  5.184  5.203*  5.382  5.413
(1.680)  (1.690)  (1.620)  (1.630)
ome real GDP growth  ,- x  Spain  -4.284  -4.269  -4.081  -4.123
-(0.630)  -(0.620)  -(0.580)  -(0.590)
ome real GDP growth  . 1 x  UK  -3.623  -3.207  -1.662  -1.845
-(0.220)  -(0.200)  -(0.100)  -(0.110)
ome rcal GDP growthp.  It  x US  -5.540  -5.547  -6.384  -6.356 *
-(2.280)  -(2.280)  -(2.400)  -(2.400)
ome  real interest rate 1 .,.  x Canada  -15.124 "  -15.068 "'  -15.010  -15.071 
-(3.380)  -(3.360)  -(3.400)  -(3.410)
ome  real interest rate.,  x France  0.250  0.243  0.343  0.350
(0.150)  (0.150)  (0.210)  (0.210)
Home real interest rate  j.,u  x Germany  0.561  0.558  1.355  1.411
(0.200)  (0.200)  (0.460)  (0.480)
Home real interest rate.,-,  x Japan  -10.527 "  -10.515 "  -10.536 '  -10.560  "
-(2.020)  -(2.020)  -(1.960)  -(1.960)
Home  real interest rate 1 . x  Spain  -0.146  -0.149  -0.153  -0.128
-(0.060)  -(0.060)  -(0.060)  -(0.050)
Home real interest rate 1,.1  x  UK  17.031  17.136  17.761  17.501
(1.010)  (1.010)  (1.070)  (1.050)
Home real interest rate 1.1.1 x US  -6.867 "  -6.828  -6.116  -6.186*"
(2.540)  -(2.530)  -(2.190)  -(2.210)
Local currency i / USS exchange rate),,  0.013  0.013  -0.031  -0.032
(0.880)  (0.890)  -(1.300)  -(1.320)
Local currency j / US$ exchange rate),.,  0.391  0.392  0.422  0.424
(1.330)  (1.330)  (1.370)  (1.370)
Change  in host rating  i.  1.144  1.151 **  1.089  1.096*4
(2.330)  (2.340)  (2.180)  (2.190)
Change  in host rating nt., x Exposure to i  -0.078  -0.077  -0.125 '  -0.125 '
-(1.200)  -(1.190)  41.770)  -(1.770)
Change  in private real claims on all other
cuntries,_  0.137  "'0.137  "'0.150  "'0.149  "
(2.940)  (2.950)  (3.200)  (3.180)
Host banking crisis dummy  5.845  6.017  1.616  1.864
(0.580)  (0.600)  (0.120)  (0.140)
Host banking crisis dummy x Exposure to i  -2.474  -2.494  5.139  5.138
-(0.91 0)  -(0.920)  (1.220)  (1.220)
ost currency  crisis dummy  -16.337 *  -14.732  -10.483  -7.667
-(1.720)  -(1.450)  -(1.610)  -(1.130)
Host currency crisis dummy x  Exposure to i  0.841  0.565  0.763  0.639
(0.660)  (0.430)  (0.690)  (0.560)
Host twin crisis dummy  -4.424  -4.174  -7.399  -7.016
-(0.620)  -(0.580)  -(1.220)  -(1.170)
Host twin crisis dummy x  Exposure to i  1.965  1.949  1.932'  1.919 *
(1.000)  (0.990)  (1.680)  (1.670)
Number of Observations  804  804  780  780
R-Squared  0.1662  0.1658  0.165  0.1646
t-statistics are  in parentheses (calculated on the basis of robust standard errors). *  denote significance at  10, 5, and I percent, respectively.
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